revision of an earlier deleted post
May. 1st, 2012 08:45 amOne of the panel discussions in the three-day Neuro Humanities Entanglement Conference at Georgia Tech ended with the observation that the cognitive sciences are still in a very early stage of their development. (I would add, “Even if their proponents engage in rhetoric that would lead us to think or believe otherwise.”)
These sciences have, however, advanced sufficiently that we can now (or so I think) begin to engage in some efforts of historical re-interpretation...such as recognizing the lineaments of proto-versions of the cognitive sciences that would not have recognized themselves as such. (Examples occur to me that I wouldn’t necessarily recommend spending time on...just because even the least useful system contains a kernel of authentic discovery doesn’t mean that it is worthwhile for anyone other than historians to analyze that kernel of authentic discovery.) It ought to be possible to begin to study the physiology of all these aspects of the inner life more systematically than it has hitherto been.
The problem, as an encounter at the very beginning of the Conference made clear, is that the physiological researchers often don’t know how to interpret the relevant historical documents and the folks who know how to ferret out the implications of historical texts and material objects often have only the most rudimentary and metaphoric knowledge of the physiology. Barbara Maria Stafford brought some of these types together in a setting that occasionally allowed participants to correct the naive errors of other specialists, and more often gave rise to efforts to fill in some of the gaps in personal knowledge that most of the participants were all too ready to admit.
If I ever get my own current interdisciplinary projects sufficiently resolved before their deadlines, I look forward to returning to Stafford’s anthology of essays on bridging the divide between the humanities and the neurosciences. I wish the gulf between the neurosciences and the sociology of knowledge had been bridged a bit more intensively, since it is in that juncture that it becomes possible to rethink our least comprehended mental limitations.
These sciences have, however, advanced sufficiently that we can now (or so I think) begin to engage in some efforts of historical re-interpretation...such as recognizing the lineaments of proto-versions of the cognitive sciences that would not have recognized themselves as such. (Examples occur to me that I wouldn’t necessarily recommend spending time on...just because even the least useful system contains a kernel of authentic discovery doesn’t mean that it is worthwhile for anyone other than historians to analyze that kernel of authentic discovery.) It ought to be possible to begin to study the physiology of all these aspects of the inner life more systematically than it has hitherto been.
The problem, as an encounter at the very beginning of the Conference made clear, is that the physiological researchers often don’t know how to interpret the relevant historical documents and the folks who know how to ferret out the implications of historical texts and material objects often have only the most rudimentary and metaphoric knowledge of the physiology. Barbara Maria Stafford brought some of these types together in a setting that occasionally allowed participants to correct the naive errors of other specialists, and more often gave rise to efforts to fill in some of the gaps in personal knowledge that most of the participants were all too ready to admit.
If I ever get my own current interdisciplinary projects sufficiently resolved before their deadlines, I look forward to returning to Stafford’s anthology of essays on bridging the divide between the humanities and the neurosciences. I wish the gulf between the neurosciences and the sociology of knowledge had been bridged a bit more intensively, since it is in that juncture that it becomes possible to rethink our least comprehended mental limitations.