I intend to write a less jocular version of this for cross-posting to Counterforces, but my mostly literary readership here expects a jig or a tale of bawdry, even if they are polite enough not to sleep, so this rendition is full of consciously inconsistent diction:
Imagery in the 21st Century: Half-Assed Notes on Cross-Disciplinary Thought, Occasioned by a New Book from Oliver Grau
I remain frustrated by the growing realization that while “interdisciplinary” is the word with which to conjure in today’s trendy academic environments, nobody is ever interdisciplinary enough.
Of course, everybody (myself included) writes for specific audiences, but this is part of the problem. Each of the audiences possesses a perspective and a body of knowledge that all the other audiences would find beneficial, could it be but translated into their vocabulary and their set of interests. To complicate matters further, we are speaking (he said rhetorically) about a small percentage and mostly a not very influential percentage of the body politic; by and large, society runs on grossly oversimplified myths that wouldn’t have passed muster even in those blissful days of simplicity that we in the Euroamerican civilizations call the mid-twentieth century. Each of us thinks we are enlightened, or hip, or in the right because our myth is different from the ones espoused by those ignorant folks over there, but by and large they are oversimplified myths nonetheless. Even those of us who are quite advanced in our specialties run our daily lives on gross oversimplifications, when we don’t simply ignore as much as possible the topics we don’t find interesting.
This now-familiar outburst was elicited this time by the inconsistencies of a potentially quite important new MIT Press book edited by Oliver Grau, misleadingly titled Imagery in the 21st Century—it’s actually about the uses of visual images in contemporary culture, both high-elite and lowbrow-popular, and in contemporary academic disciplines, plus the implications of practical applications of the latter plus a few side trips towards psychoanalytic territory. What we ordinary-English speakers mean by “imagery” has nothing to do with it, any more than the “imaginary” of high theory has anything to do with what ordinary English means by the imaginary—except insofar as all human ventures are made-up enterprises that have real effects in the physical world—“imaginary gardens with real toads in them.”
So vocabulary is one problem—large parts of the book are written in an international English that, just as George Steiner predicted all those years ago, is evolving as a language of its own, with nuances and accepted grammatical constructions that are not quite those of American or British English—Commonwealth English, I would say, except that the Commonwealth has quite a few interesting variants within it, just as the francophone possesses sophisticated variants on French that would horrify the French Academy.
Another problem is that even the native speakers who write about images, and even more those who write about their digital production, frequently don’t have a very firm grasp of the uses of English. (I presume the same problem obtains in the Romance and Slavic languages, but I’ve never read any outcries about it from those quarters, because that is not the kind of problem that gets discussed very much cross-culturally.)
Put more simply, they not only have no sense of literary style, they get commonplace idioms wrong. And yet they are the only translators we have for the specialized disciplines in which more traditional literary types are utterly at sea.
James Elkins, who contributes an essay on “Visual Practices Across the University” to this anthology, is capable of clear and consistent prose, as well as a capacity to look at the multiple functions of visual images in academically acceptable discourse. Coming from a background in aesthetics and art history, Elkins has variously looked closely at the difficulties of establishing a truly global view of contemporary art practice (practice that, as any skeptical reader of art magazines can tell you, does not always make perfect), and more recently at the multiple approaches to the visual image in fields of investigation very far apart from art. In this essay, he suggests that “Like languages, visual practices come in families,” with “the same affinities [that] occur in natural languages.” Elkins takes the overweening pride of artworld theoreticians down a peg: “There is an often implicit claim among visual studies scholars that image interpretation is theorized mainly in the humanities, but if there is a preeminent language family here it would be medical semiotics. by contrast, the humanities own only a small number of ways of interpreting images.” As he concludes, addressing his most likely audience, “…the disciplines of art history, visual studies, and even visual communications remain focused on fine art, popular art, and unquantified images. …[T]he study of the visual is carried on mainly by people who are uninterested in science and engineering and that shows no signs of changing,… But what reasons do we have, aside the many habits of art, our attachment to the humanities, and our lack of engagement with unpopularized science and mathematics, to keep our distance from so much of the visual world?”
And that’s only one essay. The very next essay, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun’s elusively language-savvy “On Sourcery, or Code as Fetish,” sums up the difficulties of a related problem: “It seems impossible to know the extent, content, and effects of new media. Who knows the entire contents of the World Wide Web or the full extent of the Internet or of mobile networks? Who can expertly move from analyzing social networking sites to Japanese cell phone novels to World of Warcraft to networking protocols to ephemeral art installations? Is a global picture of new media possible?” Chun doesn’t answer either of these rhetorical questions, the second less rhetorical than the first, because she moves on to her actual topic: the present-day notion in new media studies that all since all of these phenomena rely on software, they can be reduced to this “visibly invisible essence.” Well, no, they can’t, and reading through Chun’s essay leaves me, at least, convinced that new media theorists may not be the best source from which to begin thinking about the real issues in the mindset necessary to write usable code, and the uses to which this code is put. Chun seems to get close to the issues in her discussion, but her ignorance of other ways of putting the question somewhat vitiate her discussion of the fetish of source code—in spite of which, her explications of the basics of what is fetishized (not the code itself but the notions lying behind it) may be helpful to those of us who are described in Elkins’ concluding exhortation.
There are twenty essays of at least this degree of complexity to go through, and I’m not sure I’ll ever be capable of absorbing them sufficiently to produce a comprehensive, properly critical review.
But the sheer amount of ignorance—not stupidity, simply unawareness—implicit in the choice of topics and of language does much to push me towards the notion that there need to be not only Conferences on Consciousness like the one I have tirelessly been proposing, but Conferences on the Products of Consciousness that will address the problems of producing metalanguages within which we can do a better job of understanding what it is that we don’t understand (to quote one of my favorite Charlie Brown cartoon strips).
Imagery
I remain frustrated by the growing realization that while “interdisciplinary” is the word with which to conjure in today’s trendy academic environments, nobody is ever interdisciplinary enough.
Of course, everybody (myself included) writes for specific audiences, but this is part of the problem. Each of the audiences possesses a perspective and a body of knowledge that all the other audiences would find beneficial, could it be but translated into their vocabulary and their set of interests. To complicate matters further, we are speaking (he said rhetorically) about a small percentage and mostly a not very influential percentage of the body politic; by and large, society runs on grossly oversimplified myths that wouldn’t have passed muster even in those blissful days of simplicity that we in the Euroamerican civilizations call the mid-twentieth century. Each of us thinks we are enlightened, or hip, or in the right because our myth is different from the ones espoused by those ignorant folks over there, but by and large they are oversimplified myths nonetheless. Even those of us who are quite advanced in our specialties run our daily lives on gross oversimplifications, when we don’t simply ignore as much as possible the topics we don’t find interesting.
This now-familiar outburst was elicited this time by the inconsistencies of a potentially quite important new MIT Press book edited by Oliver Grau, misleadingly titled Imagery in the 21st Century—it’s actually about the uses of visual images in contemporary culture, both high-elite and lowbrow-popular, and in contemporary academic disciplines, plus the implications of practical applications of the latter plus a few side trips towards psychoanalytic territory. What we ordinary-English speakers mean by “imagery” has nothing to do with it, any more than the “imaginary” of high theory has anything to do with what ordinary English means by the imaginary—except insofar as all human ventures are made-up enterprises that have real effects in the physical world—“imaginary gardens with real toads in them.”
So vocabulary is one problem—large parts of the book are written in an international English that, just as George Steiner predicted all those years ago, is evolving as a language of its own, with nuances and accepted grammatical constructions that are not quite those of American or British English—Commonwealth English, I would say, except that the Commonwealth has quite a few interesting variants within it, just as the francophone possesses sophisticated variants on French that would horrify the French Academy.
Another problem is that even the native speakers who write about images, and even more those who write about their digital production, frequently don’t have a very firm grasp of the uses of English. (I presume the same problem obtains in the Romance and Slavic languages, but I’ve never read any outcries about it from those quarters, because that is not the kind of problem that gets discussed very much cross-culturally.)
Put more simply, they not only have no sense of literary style, they get commonplace idioms wrong. And yet they are the only translators we have for the specialized disciplines in which more traditional literary types are utterly at sea.
James Elkins, who contributes an essay on “Visual Practices Across the University” to this anthology, is capable of clear and consistent prose, as well as a capacity to look at the multiple functions of visual images in academically acceptable discourse. Coming from a background in aesthetics and art history, Elkins has variously looked closely at the difficulties of establishing a truly global view of contemporary art practice (practice that, as any skeptical reader of art magazines can tell you, does not always make perfect), and more recently at the multiple approaches to the visual image in fields of investigation very far apart from art. In this essay, he suggests that “Like languages, visual practices come in families,” with “the same affinities [that] occur in natural languages.” Elkins takes the overweening pride of artworld theoreticians down a peg: “There is an often implicit claim among visual studies scholars that image interpretation is theorized mainly in the humanities, but if there is a preeminent language family here it would be medical semiotics. by contrast, the humanities own only a small number of ways of interpreting images.” As he concludes, addressing his most likely audience, “…the disciplines of art history, visual studies, and even visual communications remain focused on fine art, popular art, and unquantified images. …[T]he study of the visual is carried on mainly by people who are uninterested in science and engineering and that shows no signs of changing,… But what reasons do we have, aside the many habits of art, our attachment to the humanities, and our lack of engagement with unpopularized science and mathematics, to keep our distance from so much of the visual world?”
And that’s only one essay. The very next essay, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun’s elusively language-savvy “On Sourcery, or Code as Fetish,” sums up the difficulties of a related problem: “It seems impossible to know the extent, content, and effects of new media. Who knows the entire contents of the World Wide Web or the full extent of the Internet or of mobile networks? Who can expertly move from analyzing social networking sites to Japanese cell phone novels to World of Warcraft to networking protocols to ephemeral art installations? Is a global picture of new media possible?” Chun doesn’t answer either of these rhetorical questions, the second less rhetorical than the first, because she moves on to her actual topic: the present-day notion in new media studies that all since all of these phenomena rely on software, they can be reduced to this “visibly invisible essence.” Well, no, they can’t, and reading through Chun’s essay leaves me, at least, convinced that new media theorists may not be the best source from which to begin thinking about the real issues in the mindset necessary to write usable code, and the uses to which this code is put. Chun seems to get close to the issues in her discussion, but her ignorance of other ways of putting the question somewhat vitiate her discussion of the fetish of source code—in spite of which, her explications of the basics of what is fetishized (not the code itself but the notions lying behind it) may be helpful to those of us who are described in Elkins’ concluding exhortation.
There are twenty essays of at least this degree of complexity to go through, and I’m not sure I’ll ever be capable of absorbing them sufficiently to produce a comprehensive, properly critical review.
But the sheer amount of ignorance—not stupidity, simply unawareness—implicit in the choice of topics and of language does much to push me towards the notion that there need to be not only Conferences on Consciousness like the one I have tirelessly been proposing, but Conferences on the Products of Consciousness that will address the problems of producing metalanguages within which we can do a better job of understanding what it is that we don’t understand (to quote one of my favorite Charlie Brown cartoon strips).